- BODY HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT 522 MANUAL
- BODY HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT 522 PORTABLE
- BODY HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT 522 SERIES
Then the flight crew on board neglected to check it, either by scanning or by reading out and naming the items on the pre-flight checklist.
BODY HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT 522 MANUAL
During the groundchecks carried out just a few hours before the flight took off, Helios’s ground engineers had switched the air pressure valve to manual in order to create artificial compression conditions, but then forgot to switch it back to auto.
BODY HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT 522 PORTABLE
Prodromou stayed conscious by using portable oxygen bottles, perhaps because he had been able to put an oxygen mask on when the plane fell to 14,000 feet. Even if the heroic cabin steward Andreas Prodromou, who sent out a Mayday message, had been able to land the plane as he apparently was trying to do, the rest of those on board still breathing would have been in a vegetative state.
All the passengers would have suffered irreversible brain damage due to lack of oxygen, according to the coroners’ report.
From then on the plane was on automatic pilot. Passengers and crew would at first have fallen into an altered state and then lost consciousness, while the pilot collapsed in the cockpit. Meanwhile, the airplane had become a gas chamber. He may have attempted to reset the system or activate a backup system. The German pilot got up to deal with the second malfunction. The air pressure level in the cabin was shown to be the same as it had been at 8,500 feet, when the second malfunction (overheating) in the communication cooling system (found under the pilot’s seat) occurred. As the aircraft rose to its cruising altitude of 34,000 feet and the problem remained unsolved, the gradual decompression began to affect passengers and crew the latter, however, did not realize what was wrong. The pressure switch had not been checked and so remained in the manual position the warning alarm caused confusion since the same alarm also sounds for a quite different malfunction – the position of the flaps and the wheels while on the ground. The aircraft cabin was already losing pressure and, as it turned out, the flight crew had not carried out the appropriate checks before takeoff in accordance with the pre-takeoff checklist. Technicians on the ground in Larnaca had left the cabin air pressure switch in the manual position, instead of switching it over to auto, as they were supposed to do. The warnings (both an alarm and a light) came when the aircraft rose above 10,000 feet. Clarifications were sought from technicians on the ground. During takeoff, just a few minutes after 9 a.m., instruments almost simultaneously gave two warnings regarding air pressure and cooling systems. Mistakes on the ground The Helios aircraft crashed because of errors made on the ground which were then not dealt with in the air. As for Helios Airways, the findings point to criminal negligence on the ground and in the air, both on the part of company officials and ground staff involved in the particular flight. The report will attribute blame to both state and airline authorities for the unprecedented lack of any evaluation of the flight security system by the Cypriot Civil Aviation Authority.
BODY HELIOS AIRWAYS FLIGHT 522 SERIES
Sources have revealed to Kathimerini that the report will attribute a long series of mistakes on the part of all those in Cyprus involved in flight security.
Apparently neither of the two malfunctions that appeared simultaneously during the flight could have caused the aircraft to crash if there had not also been dozens of other omissions related to flight security. The crash of a Boeing aircraft near Athens last August that killed all 121 passengers and crew will go down in aviation history as a case study of what can go wrong, according to an interim report to be released by the Investigation Commission for Accidents and Flight Security (EDAAP) in early April.
0 kommentar(er)
